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Kate Rigby
2  Earth’s Poesy: Romantic Poetics, Natural 
Philosophy, and Biosemiotics
Abstract: This chapter undertakes an exploration of the pre-history of contemporary 
biosemiotics in Romantic ecopoetics, beginning with the ways in which Romantic 
natural philosophies, such as those of Schelling and Goethe, opened the way for a 
renewed appreciation of the subjective ‘worlds’ or Umwelten, as Jakob von Uexküll 
later termed them, along with the agency, communicative capacity, and, in some 
cases, ethical considerability of more-than-human beings. Secondly, I will examine 
the implications of this philosophical re-animation of materiality for the reconcep-
tualization of human language, especially as deployed to poetic ends. Here, I turn to 
Friedrich Schlegel’s (1967 [1800]) “Conversation on Poetry,” in which human poiesis, 
the crafting of ideational worlds by means of words, is repositioned as an emergent 
property of the prior autopoiesis of natural becoming. Finally, I will indicate how this 
German proto-biosemiotics finds a literary counterpart in the ecosemiotics of English 
Romantic literature, focusing on John Clare’s birds’ nest poetry.
Key Terms: Biosemiotics, Romanticism, Goethe, Schelling, Clare
In 1800, the avant-garde journal of German Romantic literature and theory, Athenäum 
(“Athenaeum”) serialized a work entitled Gespräch über die Poesie (“Conversation on 
Poesie”) (Schlegel 1967, 184–190). Penned by one of the journal’s founding editors, 
Friedrich Schlegel, this early document of modern literary theory was inspired by the 
lively discussions that Schlegel had been engaged in over the past few years with 
a group of friends who became known as the “Jena Romantics.” Among them were 
his brother, the literary translator and cultural historian, August Wilhelm, and his 
wife Caroline (who hosted most of their gatherings), the writers Friedrich von Hard-
enberg (better known by his nom de plume Novalis) and Johann Ludwig Tieck, the 
philosopher, Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling, Friedrich’s lover, Dorothea Veit, and 
(while Schlegel had been staying with him in Berlin in 1799) the theologian Friedrich 
Schleiermacher. The Gespräch stages an open-ended debate about literature, within 
which four of the participants present a series of longer disquisitions on various ques-
tions: Andrea’s account of the “Epochs of Literature,” Ludovico’s “Talk on Mythol-
ogy,” Antonio’s “Letter on the Novel” and Marcus’s analysis of the style of Goethe’s 
earlier and later works. From a contemporary ecocritical perspective, what is particu-
larly striking about this debate is the way in which it is framed in the “Prologue.” 
All human “poesy” or artistic making, Schlegel declares here, is dependent upon, 
and indeed grows out of, the prior “unformed and unconscious poesy” of the living 
earth, of which we are ourselves a “bloom.” This primal poesy, which “stirs in the 
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plant and shines in the light, smiles in a child, gleams in the flower of youth, and 
glows in the loving bosom of women,” has always been humanity’s privileged “object 
and source of activity and joy” (Schlegel 1968, 54). The human capacity to “hear the 
music of the unceasing action” (unendlichen Spielwerks, my translation, Schlegel 
1967, 285) of earthly becoming, and “to understand the beauty of [this] poem,” arises 
because we are ourselves “a part of the poet, a part of his creative spirit lives in us 
and never ceases to glow with secret force under the ashes of our self-induced unrea-
son” (Schlegel 1968, 54). Schlegel’s re-configuration of human creativity and literary 
language as an outgrowth of ‘Earth’s poesy’ is informed by the new understandings 
of natural history, living systems, and human subjectivity that emerged during the 
Romantic period. In this chapter, I want to revisit German Romantic notions of the 
‘language of nature’ and ‘natural language’ (Natursprache), along with the depiction 
of other-than-human viewpoints and voices by the English Romantic poet John Clare, 
from the perspective of contemporary research and reflection in the field of ‘biosem-
iotics.’
1  Biosemiotic Basics
Biosemiotics proceeds from the premise that “living nature,” as Jesper Hoffmeyer 
(2008, 4) puts it, is “essentially driven by, or actually consist[s] of, semiosis.” Among 
the diverse vehicles of communication that are perpetually composing, recomposing, 
decomposing and interconnecting the multifarious life-forms that constitute Earth’s 
biosphere are sound, scent, movement, pressure, texture, taste, and shape, as well as 
more elusive, but nonetheless powerfully efficacious phenomena, such as electrical 
fields and chemical effusions. From a biosemiotic perspective, the whole world – or 
rather all worlds, since each organism inhabits its own – is, as Peirce put it, “perfused 
with signs” (qtd. in Wheeler 2011, 271): from the level of the individual cell, which 
perforce interprets the genome that it contains in order to help build a body within 
a particular bio-physical environment, to that of the literary critic who, perchance, 
interprets a poem to help build understanding within a particular socio-cultural envi-
ronment. This is a fast-growing field with diverse disciplinary manifestations, ram-
ifications, and cross-fertilizations. Claus Emmeche’s succinct definition from 1992 
nonetheless still holds good:
Biosemiotics proper deals with sign processes in nature in all dimensions, including 1) the emer-
gence of semiosis in nature, which may coincide with or anticipate the emergence of living cells; 
2) the natural history of signs; 3) the ‘horizontal’ aspect of semiosis in the ontogeny of organisms, 
in plant and animal communication, and in inner sign functions in the immune and nervous 
systems; and 4) the semiotics of cognition and language. (Hoffmeyer 2008, 4)
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Biosemiotics proper, as Hoffmeyer observes, was invented independently several 
times over in the latter part of the twentieth century. Hoffmeyer himself is a biochem-
ist and he recounts how he and his then doctoral student Claus Emmeche arrived at 
their own version of the ‘semiotics of nature’ at the University of Copenhagen in the 
late 1980s. Meanwhile, in Estonia, a series of scholarly exchanges between Russian 
and Estonian biologists and linguists that began with a conference in Tartu in 1978, 
led Kalevi Kull to develop an expanded understanding of the ‘semiosphere,’ a term 
first framed by Russian Formalist Yuri Lotman by analogy with geologist and bioge-
ographer V. I. Vernadsky’s ‘biosphere’ concept from 1926: Kull’s breakthrough was to 
realize that the biosphere was in itself a richly polylogic semiosphere. Hoffmeyer also 
acknowledges that Gregory Bateson, who was a major inspiration for his own work, 
developed a similarly semiotic understanding of living systems. As Louise Westling 
shows in The Logos of the Living World, Maurice Merleau-Ponty was heading that way 
too in his late lectures on Nature. It is widely accepted, however, that the preeminent 
figure who “had the broadminded intellect and indefatigable energy to assemble all 
the threads that would serve as the foundation for the modern biosemiotic project” 
(Hoffmeyer 2008, 364) was the Hungarian-born American linguist, Thomas Sebeok 
(1920–2001), to whom Hoffmeyer’s authoritative introduction to the field is dedicated. 
The two main threads out of which Sebeok wove his synthesis were the ‘semeiotic’ phi-
losophy of American Pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) and the ‘Umwelt’ 
theory of German-Estonian biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944), which he came 
to explore with Jakob’s grandson, the medical researcher Thure von Uexküll. Sebeok 
was fascinated by non-human animal and human-animal communication, and in 
Peirce he found a theory of sign relations, which was not restricted to human verbal 
communication (unlike the semiology of Ferdinand Saussure that was taken up so 
enthusiastically in francophone structuralism and post-structuralism from the 1970s). 
In order to advance the theory of ‘zoosemiotics’ that he had already begun to postu-
late in the early 1960s, Sebeok needed to be able to account for the process whereby 
animals come to translate corporeal sensations into meaningful perceptions. And it 
was in the revised second edition of Jakob von Uexküll’s Theoretische Biologie (The-
oretical Biology, 1928), which he read in the original German in 1978 (having perused 
and dismissed a poor English translation of the first edition thirty years earlier) that 
he found the key: namely, in his refashioning of the existing German term Umwelt 
(environment) to designate a species-specific and more-or-less individually nuanced 
phenomenal world, a world, that is, composed of signs. As Hoffmeyer (2008, 32) 
observes, von Uexküll “was working very much within a nineteenth century Roman-
tic intellectual culture that was still vibrant in Estonia, while the science of Charles 
Darwin’s England was increasingly utilitarian, mechanistic and Malthusian.” Among 
his most important influences, moreover, were F. W. J. von Schelling’s Naturphiloso-
phie and the developmental or ‘epigenetic’ biology of Goethe and Karl Ernst von Baer, 
among others (Kull 2001, 4).
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Von Uexküll’s research into the perceptual worlds of other-than-human animals 
revealed how every creature’s Umwelt is borne out of the functionality of its particular 
bodily constitution and conditioned by its developmental stage and life experience: 
it is correlated with a mental model of reality, or Innenwelt, that determines whether 
and how any entity that enters an animal’s physical environment might become a 
bearer of meaning within a species-specific world of signs (Merkwelt); one that it 
will be called upon to interpret wisely in order to interact with it appropriately (for 
example, as predator, prey, play-fellow, mate, or the source of some other kind of 
potential trouble, pleasure, or interest). The relationship between an organism and its 
environment is dynamic, being continuously renegotiated through what von Uexküll 
termed the “functional cycle” (Funktionskreis) of perception and action that “effec-
tively ‘couples’ the ever-changing system that is the organism to the ever-changing 
system that is the world” (Favareau 2008, 32). While Sebeok and others have since 
extended this zoosemiotic line of inquiry, others have gone on to explore such weird 
and wonderful semiotic processes as those occurring within organisms (‘endosemio-
sis’), among plants (‘phytosemiosis’), and even in inanimate nature (‘physiosemio-
sis’). Of particular relevance to this chapter is the nascent field of ‘ecosemiotics’ (Kull 
1998), encompassing research into human communication with, and about, nature, 
as mediated through the sign systems of human culture, which might be considered 
part of the wider field of environmental (or ‘ecocritical’) literary and cultural studies.
Most biosemiotic research hitherto has been conducted by natural scientists. 
However, it has also begun to attract the attention of a growing number of researchers 
in the environmental humanities, as can be seen from Wendy Wheeler’s contribution 
to this volume. In addition to restoring communicative agency to non-humans, biose-
miotics significantly expands our understanding of human sign relations. As “whole 
creatures,” as Wheeler has it, humans, in common with other animals, also partici-
pate in a host of corporeal communications that generally transpire below the level 
of consciousness. It is for this reason, as Peirce stressed, that we always know more 
than we think we know. Caught up, as we tend to be, in the world composed by the 
words that are forever running through our heads, passing out our mouths, into our 
ears, or being traced by our eyes or finger-tips, much of what we know viscerally, so to 
speak, does not make it into our field of awareness. Occasionally, though, some of the 
signs that our mindful bodies are perpetually decoding might be felt in the flesh, as 
in the approach of a threat, the source of which we have not yet identified; or intuited 
as a hunch, which could give rise to one of those creative insights that Peirce termed 
“abductions” (Wheeler 2011).
This is not to say that we would be better off without that world of words, though. 
On the contrary: biosemioticians view articulate human language as the most complex 
mode of communication that has evolved thus far on Earth. With growing complexity 
comes what Jesper Hoffmeyer (2008, 309; 2010) terms increasing “semiotic freedom,” 
entailing heightened self-awareness, including the ability to recognize, as Immanuel 
Kant influentially enjoined us to do in his Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der Urteilsk-
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raft, 1781), that the world disclosed to us through our ideas, words, and the embod-
ied experiences that they co-construct, does not necessarily correspond to the way 
things are “in themselves.” The geo-historically unprecedented degree of semiotic 
freedom that humans have acquired along their evolutionary journey has enabled 
the inter-generational creation, perpetuation and transformation of symbol-based 
communal cultures, which has in turn facilitated the emergence of greater social 
complexity and the augmentation and acceleration of communication across time 
and space through the development of new media (from writing to the internet), thus 
enabling the creation of new kinds of knowledge, along with enhanced technological 
capacities.
This growth in semiotic freedom is nonetheless a risky business. For one thing, 
it goes hand-in-hand with an ever-expanding margin of potential misunderstand-
ing: while some organisms certainly deploy signs to deceive others (for example, by 
puffing up their fur or feathers to appear larger than they actually are) my dogs are 
rather less likely to misread the chemical signal left by a fellow canine, let alone the 
sight of its raised hackles, than I am the nuances of any conversation that might tran-
spire with a neighbor while we’re all out for a walk. In everyday life, the muddles 
that can arise from the slipperiness of verbal communication, especially in written 
form, and hence in the absence of invaluable non-verbal signals, can be a real drag. 
In verbal works of art, however, this very multivalence, or semiotic openness, is of 
the essence of the aesthetic experience. More troublesome, potentially, is a further 
concomitant of the increased semiotic freedom facilitated by articulate language: 
namely, the development of a certain alienation from our own corporeal being and 
sensory perceptions, and, potentially, from other beings (especially other-than-hu-
man ones) and from the natural world more generally. Once inducted into the world 
of words, and hence into a particular cultural formation, the recognition of our cor-
poreal, or psycho-physical, interconnectedness with other creatures and our earthly 
environs no longer comes naturally. Paradoxically, the cultivation of our own bodily 
being, along with our connectivities with non-human others, is necessarily a cultural 
achievement, and, as Gernot Böhme (2003) puts it, an “ethical undertaking” (see also 
↗6 Aesthetics of Nature on the role of aesthetics in this process). Societies vary signif-
icantly in this respect, and one of the distinguishing features of euro-western culture, 
in the view of ecophilosophers such as Val Plumwood (2002), has been the predom-
inance of dualistic discourses of human exceptionalism, often grounded in claims 
about language and reason as opposed to, and elevated above, the merely material 
realm of nature, which systematically occlude the recognition of our own natural-
ity, whilst sanctioning the ruthless human exploitation of otherkind and our earthly 
environs, and contributing thereby to the growing degradation of both human and 
non-human habitats.
It is important to recall, however, that the West by no means has a monopoly 
on animal exploitation and environmental degradation: consider, for example, the 
slaughter and cruelty entailed in the use of animal products in traditional Chinese 
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medicine, or the utter denudation and consequent socio-ecological collapse of Easter 
Island in Polynesia. Nor has the hyper-separation of human reason and language from 
other-than-human forms of cognition and communication, which became accentu-
ated in Western culture with the ascendency of Renaissance humanism and Cartesian 
mind-matter dualism, ever gone unchallenged. Long before Jacques Derrida (2008) 
was prompted to reflect self-critically upon the “phallogocentrism” of Western phi-
losophy on finding himself beheld in his human-animal nakedness by a feline com-
panion, Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) pondered, “[w]hen I play with my cat, who 
knows whether I do not make her more sport than she makes me?” Desiderating the 
“vanity” of Man, who imagines “that he equals himself to God, attributes to himself 
divine qualities, withdraws and separates himself from the crowd of other creatures, 
cuts out the shares of the animals, his fellows and companions, and distributes to 
them portions of faculties and force, as himself thinks fit,” Montaigne (1842, 206) 
insists that animals “have a full and absolute communication amongst themselves, 
and that they perfectly understand one another, not only those of the same, but 
of divers kinds,” while cautioning that while we too are able to engage in various 
kinds of interspecific interchanges, our insight into the “secret and internal motions 
of animals” is inevitably limited; for we are, after all, only human. In the following 
century, Jakob Böhme (1575–1624) also acknowledged the ‘natural language’ (Natur-
Sprache) of other-than-human beings, albeit in a more mystical key than Montaigne. 
Reworking the alchemical ‘doctrine of signatures’ previously postulated by Para-
celsus (1493–1624), and drawing also on Christian Neoplatonism and Jewish Kabba-
lism, this heterodox Lutheran theologian and free-thinking philosopher (Weeks 1991) 
proposed that all creatures disclose themselves, not only to humans but also to one 
another, through the distinctive resonance or ‘voice’ (Hall) that emanates from their 
corporeal form, drives and appetites. According to Böhme, human verbal language 
also retains traces of a putative pre-lapsarian mode of speaking, which participated 
in the primal “sensual language” still “spoken” by other creatures; and although the 
original names that Adam bestowed upon creation in this natural language had been 
lost as a consequence of the Fall, he maintained that it was yet possible to have mys-
tical access to them through the agency of the Holy Spirit (as he claimed to be able to 
do himself) (Goodbody 1984, 28).
2  Proto-biosemiotics in German philosophy around 
1800
While, as we shall see, Montaigne’s observations resonate more strongly with the 
depiction of other-than-human sign relations in Clare’s animal poetry, it was Böhme’s 
novel notion of ‘Natur-Sprache’ that nourished the proto-biosemiotic line of thinking 
that began to emerge in the German region in the latter part of the eighteenth century. 
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As Axel Goodbody (1984) explains in what remains, to my knowledge, the only book-
length study of this key Romantic topos, discussions of ‘natural language’ or the ‘lan-
guage of nature’ made their way into German Romanticism via J. G. Hamann’s and 
J. G. Herder’s reception of Paracelsus and Jakob Böhme in the mid to late eighteenth 
century. This lineage is apparent, for example, in Novalis’s (1968, 267) notes towards 
his counter-encyclopèdie (Das allgemeine Brouillon, 1798/1799), when he asserts that 
it is not only humans who speak, but “the universe speaks also – everything speaks – 
infinite languages,” adding, in a clear allusion to Paracelsus: “Doctrine of signatures.”
Paracelsus’ ‘doctrine of signatures,’ according to which the allegedly divinely-en-
dowed characteristics of all natural entities were legible in their outward appearance, 
itself constituted a significant new departure within the older theological topos of 
Nature as the ‘Book of God’: that is to say, as a second source of divine revelation 
alongside the Bible. As Hans Blumenberg (1981) has shown, this trope can be traced 
back to Augustine, whose De Dialectica (398) also contains what Favareau considers 
to be the first recorded definition of sign relations within Western thought, which 
embraces both the indexical signs that are rife in the natural world and human lin-
guistic signs: “had the contingencies of history been otherwise,” Favareau (2008, 7) 
laments,
and had sign study proceeded from Augustine’s definitions, rather than from a radically disem-
boweled version of Aristotle […] we may not have found ourselves here today still trying to estab-
lish as a general understanding the idea that the world of sign relations per se did not start with 
the advent of homo sapiens – and that a sign relation is not something that was created ex nihilo 
by the minds of human beings – but rather, that the minds of human beings are themselves the 
product of a de novo use of absolutely natural and biological sign relations.
As words in the Book of God, however, earthly phenomena were construed by Augus-
tine and later theologians up until at least the late seventeenth century, not as com-
municating in their own right, but as a medium for the voice of heaven. For Paracelsus 
too, Nature as a whole was divinely authored. But the doctrine of signatures accords 
to individual phenomena the capacity to communicate of themselves, albeit in the 
limited sense of signaling their “virtues” with respect to human interests (notably, in 
the case of plants, their medicinal uses) and thus pre-eminently, for human eyes. As 
already noted, Böhme’s elaboration and radicalization of Paracelsus’s ‘signatures’ 
transgresses this anthropocentric limit to allow for the physical self-disclosure of 
living things to one another, thereby decentring humans as the only creatures capable 
of interpreting these corporeal signals.
Now, when Hamann (1730–1788) and Herder (1744–1803) revived this train of 
thought, it was in clear contradistinction to the way in which the older trope of the 
Book of Nature had begun to be deployed in the meantime, following the rise of the 
mechanistic, dualistic and empiricist ontologies and epistemologies of the Enlight-
enment. Whereas the new rationalist theological orthodoxy had relegated the divine 
author to a non-interventionist role outside of Creation, whilst rendering His work 
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newly legible according to the physical laws of nature and in the language of math-
ematics, Hamann and Herder sought to regain a sense of the material world as com-
posed of an inherently meaningful ‘hieroglyphics,’ which demanded a different kind 
of hermeneutics. For Hamann, this was a mystical hermeneutics, the purpose of which 
was a deeper experience of deity as disclosed through contemplative, as distinct from 
objectifying and instrumentalising, ways of knowing (Blumenberg 1981, 30). This 
was also true to some degree for Herder, who was an ordained Lutheran minister, 
as well as a leading thinker of what Jonathan Israel (2001) has termed the ‘radical 
enlightenment.’ This philosophical lineage descends largely from the underground 
reception of the controversial Dutch Jewish philosopher, Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), 
and, through the intermediary of Herder, subsequently contributed significantly to 
the development of early German Romanticism. I will return to Herder’s reworking 
of Spinoza, and its centrality to Romantic understandings of Earth’s “poesy” in due 
course. Firstly though, I want to consider a fascinating earlier essay that Herder wrote 
for the Prussian Royal Academy of Sciences’ 1770 competition to determine whether 
humans were capable of inventing language, solely on the basis of their natural abil-
ities.
In his “Treatise on the Origin of Language” [Abhandlung über den Ursprung der 
Sprache], Herder (1985) rejects the theological premise that language was gifted to 
humans by God, while simultaneously complicating the opposing rationalist view 
that it is an arbitrary human invention. He begins by stressing the creaturely dimen-
sions of human communication, asserting that “[a]lready as an animal, the human 
being has language” (Herder 2002, 65; emphasis in the original). This is the language 
of affect  – of cries, sighs, and yells of joy, for instance  – that we share with other 
animals. While generally subordinated to the conventional signs of articulate speech, 
this creaturely ‘natural language’ continues to flow as an underground current in 
much of our communication, as well as granting us an intuitive understanding of the 
affective responses of other animals, especially those with whom we have a greater 
affinity, such as terrestrial herd animals, as distinct from those who are more dis-
similar from us in “nerve structure” and way of life, such as sea creatures (2002, 67). 
Yet, while Herder allows that remnants of those natural sounds that are specific to 
our species being constitute the “juices which enliven the roots of language” (68), he 
insists that articulate speech – the conventional language that has to be learnt anew 
by every child of every generation in every human culture – is a distinct development. 
Rather than construing this as a willful “invention,” however, he stresses that it was 
a natural and necessary outcome of our relatively undelimited “circle” or “sphere” 
of activity and corresponding paucity of innate technical skills and instincts: “the 
more numerous the functions and the destiny of animals are, the more dispersed their 
attention is over several objects, the less constant their manner of life is, in short, the 
larger and more diverse their sphere is, then the more we see its sensuousness distribute 
itself and weaken” (78; emphasis in the original) and, so Herder reasons, the greater 
its need of a more complex mode of communication.
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In the absence of the kinds of ethological research that are only now beginning 
that to disclose the extensive role of learning, and hence culture, in the communica-
tive practices of several other species (such as cetaceans, some birds, dogs, and other 
primates), Herder probably overstates the uniqueness of human speech. Importantly, 
however, he stresses that the language of words emerges only in and through our 
embodied experience of a more-than-human world that resounds with the voices of 
other creatures. Herder traces the development of human language to our innate dis-
position for ‘reflective discernment’ (Besonnenheit), the cognitive desire to identify 
what is distinctive about each physical entity that comes to our attention, which com-
pensates for our paucity of other instincts. Herder exemplifies this process of reflec-
tive apperception in a distinctly Arcadian primal scene of human language-formation 
involving a fellow creature, which initially appears to the senses of sight and touch 
as “white, soft, woolly”: unlike the hungry wolf, who is liable to cognize the lamb 
exclusively with reference to its own appetites as food, or the randy ram, who sizes it 
up as a potential mate, Herder’s first human, propelled by a different kind of appetite, 
namely, the desire to know (the appetitus noscendi, as Augustine put it [Trabant 2009, 
125]), apprehends the lamb’s vocalization as its ‘distinguishing mark’ (Merkmal), and 
is thereby imagined to have cried out inwardly to himself, “Aha, you are the bleating 
one!” (Herder 2002, 88). Whereas G. W. F. Hegel would later construe human naming 
practices as a form of mastery that “annihilates” the singularity of all things by sub-
stituting for the particularity of their physical reality something ideational that could 
henceforth exist in the absence of the thing thus named (Rigby 2004, 123), Herder 
traces the origins of language to an act of non-appropriative attentive listening to the 
animal other, who is perceived, moreover, as an alter ego, a “thou” (Trabant 2009, 
130). (It must be admitted, however, although Herder does not do so, that this would 
not necessarily have prevented the subsequent classification of the lamb, by said 
human no less than the wolf, as food, or even, by said human no less than the randy 
ram, as an object of genital gratification!) In my view, Hegel also has a point: but 
Herder’s fundamentally dialogical account of the origins of language implies a mode 
of ethical comportment as proper to human being, or rather, becoming human, which 
bears profound ecological and biosemiotic significance: this is, as Trabant (2009, 130) 
observes, “an appeal to let the world breathe and resound, and to dialogue with it.”
For Herder, language and thought are inseparable: indeed, in arguing that the 
recognition of the lamb qua lamb by her bleating occurs first as a responsive bleating 
in the soul of the cognizing human, he implies that the use of words to communicate 
with others is secondary to the function of language as a way of thinking. This sec-
ondary function is nonetheless no less crucial to the process of becoming human, 
which Herder understands to be an historically unfolding process, entailing ever-wid-
ening circles of sociality, from families, through tribes and nations with their glori-
ously diverse languages and hence (potentially conflictual) ways of thinking, to the 
transnational and ultimately global: for humans, Herder (2002, 159–161) insists in 
conclusion, are not “national animals,” but one “species” with the capacity to grow 
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in understanding and accomplishments by respectfully learning from one another 
across the permeable boundaries of cultural and linguistic difference. Moreover, 
while Herder might be mistaken in his assertion of the uniqueness of the cognitive 
desire that, he claims, all humans (but only humans) share, the spoken language 
to which it gives rise is activated by our embodied participation in an even wider, 
namely trans-species, Earth community. If, as ancient tradition has it, human speech 
first took the form of song, then, Herder (2002, 104) speculates, this must have com-
prised a “concerto,” composed out of the diverse vocalizations of other creatures, 
“to the extent that his understanding needed them, his sensation grasped them, his 
organs were able to express them […] within the natural scale of the human voice”: 
here then, the human poesy of words is thought to have enjoyed its first flowering as 
a mode of participation in the polyphonic song of the Earth.
At the time that Herder penned his entry for the Berlin Academy’s essay compe-
tition on one of the hottest topics of the age, he had already begun to take an interest 
in Spinoza, having perused his Ethics (Ethica, 1677) and Theological-Political Trea-
tise (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 1677) in the late 1760s. Influentially, Herder also 
commended Spinoza (along with German folksong) to the younger writer, J. W. Goethe 
(1749–1832), whom he met in 1771, and together they embarked on a close study of 
the Ethics during 1773–1774. Spinozan references and ideas become increasingly fre-
quent and significant in Herder’s writing from this time, but it was only in the wake 
of the virulent critique of Spinozan ‘nihilism’ launched by the theologian J. H. Jacobi 
(1743–1819) that Herder truly “came out” as a Spinozist in his famous credo, God: 
Some Conversations (1787) (Bell 1986; Forster 2012). In addition to embracing Spi-
noza’s historically contextualizing and de-mythologizing approach to biblical her-
meneutics, along with his democratic and egalitarian political orientation, Herder 
adopted a version of his metaphysical monism: that it, the understanding of mind 
and matter (or ‘extension’), God and Nature, as indivisible, albeit distinct, manifes-
tations of the one universal substance. There is perhaps already a trace of Spinozan 
monism evident in Herder’s insistence that human language and hence thought is 
wholly dependent upon our bodily participation in the communicative matrix of the 
more-than-human world. But it was only in his essay “Shakespeare” (Herder 1993), 
which sparked a craze for Shakespearean drama in Germany and defined the terms in 
which it also became revalued in Britain during the Romantic period (and beyond), 
that he openly asserts that “the whole can be called that giant God of Spinoza, ‘Pan! 
Universe’” (1993, 515).
Herder’s was nonetheless a renovated monism, which departed from Spinoza’s 
in key respects. In place of Spinoza’s static universal “substance,” Herder reconceives 
the divine as an active and mind-like “primal force” that is manifest in all creation, 
which is in turn understood in terms of becoming, rather than being. Whereas Spino-
za’s view of nature remained within the mechanistic paradigm that predominated in 
the seventeenth century, Herder embraced the new perspective of dynamically inter-
acting forces and organic growth that was emerging from the development of the life 
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sciences, along with the study of chemical, electrical and magnetic phenomena. In 
God: Some Conversations, Herder construes nature accordingly as “a system of living 
forces based in the primal force, God,” while characterizing this system as “a progres-
sive self-development toward ever higher forms of articulation” (Forster 2012, 80). 
In this way, Herder implicitly reconceives of the Book of Nature as self-scripting and 
evolving, rather than as externally authored and immutable. And it is in this sense 
that Friedrich Schlegel would later reframe the human capacity to create verbal works 
of art as an outgrowth of Earth’s “poesy”: for what is nature itself, from this neo-Spi-
nozist perspective, but “an eternally self-creating work of art,” as Schlegel put it in 
one of his youthful jottings (qtd. in Zimmermann 1978, 242)?
Another of Schlegel’s conversation partners in Jena whose thought was pro-
foundly informed by Herder’s renovated monism was the philosopher Schelling (also 
a keen reader of Jakob Böhme and Renaissance Neoplatonism, and an inheritor of 
Kant’s crucial epistemological distinction between noumena, or things-in-them-
selves, which we can never know directly, and phenomena, things as they appear to 
the human mind). In his System of Transcendental Idealism (System des transzenden-
talen Idealismus, 1800), Schelling (1978, 232) too refers to “what we call nature” as 
“a poem lying pent in a mysterious and wondrous script.” More importantly, though, 
Schelling’s mature philosophy of nature articulates an early version of the theory of 
evolutionary emergence. Inspired in large part by new biological research, including 
Goethe’s work on plant morphology and “metamorphosis,” Schelling reinterpreted 
Spinoza’s natura naturans (‘nature naturing’) as an immanent principle of purposive 
self-organization and dynamic self-transformation within the temporal becoming of 
the natural world as a whole (natura naturata, or ‘nature natured’), which he came 
to think of as a meta-organism (allgemeiner Organismus), of which human conscious-
ness too was integrally a part. According to the post-Kantian, neo-Spinozist theory 
of dynamic evolution advanced in On the World Soul (Zur Weltseele, 1798), life is not 
infused into matter from outside, but rather matter itself had acquired life with the 
emergence of organic forms: “Organic matter has formed within itself the principle of 
life” (Schelling 2000, 255; emphasis in the original), implying that the potential for 
the emergence of living organisms is inherent in nature. Similarly, human conscious-
ness was not infused into organic matter from outside, but could now be understood 
as having emerged through an evolutionary process, which, in his First Outline of a 
System of the Philosophy of Nature and the separately published Introduction thereto 
(both considerably indebted to his conversations with Goethe during this period), 
Schelling attributed to the dynamic interplay of generative and inhibiting forces 
within the infinite “productivity” of natural becoming (Nassar 2014, 193–202). There 
was, therefore, a real (as opposed to an ideal or transcendental) continuity between 
inorganic and organic matter, and between organic life and human consciousness: all 
things, moreover, remained interconnected within that “common medium” (Schelling 
2000, 257) that Schelling had previously troped under the ancient name (with more 
recent Neoplatonic resonances) of the “world soul.”
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The exemplar that Schelling provides as evidence for the ‘common medium’ 
interconnecting all natural phenomena at the end of the World Soul is the observed 
behavior of those animals who become visibly distressed immediately prior to the 
occurrence of large earthquakes: it is, he writes, “as if the same cause, which shat-
ters mountains and raises islands out of the sea, also moves the breathing breast of 
animals” (Schelling 2000, 257). There is now considerable empirical support for this 
phenomenon, which provides an intriguing instance of those zoosemiotic processes 
that are just beginning to be rigorously investigated (Maran et al. 2011). With respect to 
the living world, moreover, it is tempting to argue that Schelling’s ‘common medium’ 
is nothing more, nor less, mysterious than the communicative matrix of biospherical 
semiosis. This is not a possibility that he pursues here though, preferring to look for 
a universal connection, which he refers to as a “formative ether” (Schelling 2000, 
257), instead of considering the existence of particular communicative media, such 
as those that evidently enable certain other species to pick up atmospheric, haptic 
or auditory signs of an imminent earth movement that human senses are too dull, 
or too dulled, to discern and decode. In his earlier discussion of animal ‘irritability’ 
and ‘sensibility’ (Erregbarkeit and Sensibilität), Schelling does nonetheless move in a 
distinctly biosemiotic direction.
In the biology of his day, these were two of the three primary modes of ‘excitability’ 
that were seen to be characteristic of all life, the third being ‘reproduction’ (including 
growth, maintenance, self-repair, and drives, in addition to the generation of individ-
uals of like kind). ‘Irritability’ referred to physiological responses to external stimuli, 
such as the contraction of muscles, changes in the movement and constituents of 
bodily fluids, and alterations to the action of inner organs (i.e. similar to what would 
now be referred to as autonomic nervous system reactions). ‘Sensibility’ was con-
nected with ‘irritability’ but referred to the ability to make and retain impressions of 
external stimuli, to interpret them, as it were, if not necessarily consciously. The kinds 
of sensible impressions thus formed, moreover, were in turn related to an organism’s 
particular corporeal organization, its physical form, and, hence, its psycho-physical 
capacities, impulses, and orientations. What Schelling (2000, 248) refers to here as an 
animal’s “sphere of characteristic impressions” (Sphäre eigenthümlicher Eindrücke) is, 
I would suggest, an important precursor to Jakob von Uexküll’s notion of the animal’s 
Merkwelt, the semiotic bubble, through which it construes and negotiates its Umwelt. 
The signs that an animal registers as significant, for instance through its faculties 
of sight and hearing, Schelling (249) goes on to argue, are conditioned by its innate 
inclinations – its “instinct.” Recalling Herder’s insistence on the embodied nature of 
human thought and language, Schelling acknowledges that the human subject too 
only sees and hears that which s/he is “motivated” or “impelled” to recognize (wozu 
er zu erkennen Trieb hat) (250; emphasis in the original). This, however, he designates 
as a “higher instinct,” which, when directed towards that which is great and beauti-
ful, is called “genius” (250). In other words – those which he would later use in the 
System of Transcendental Idealism – what we call ‘genius,’ those brilliant insights and 
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leaps of imagination that underpin both artistic creativity and some kinds of scientific 
discovery, involves the agency of ‘the unconscious’ (das Unbewuβte, a term that he 
coined and Sigmund Freud made famous), or what Maurice Merleau-Ponty referred 
to as “silent [i.e., pre-verbal] knowing” (see ↗3 Merleau-Ponty and the Eco-Literary 
Imaginary).
It is important to stress that Schelling’s commitment to reconnecting human con-
sciousness and creativity with the more-than-human realm did not imply the nega-
tion of human freedom. This is now reconceived, however, as a potential that has 
arisen out of a temporal process of development that had given rise to increasingly 
complex levels of organization in the living world: what biologist and proto-evolu-
tionary thinker Karl Friedrich Kielmeyer, one of Schelling’s major sources (and, sub-
sequently, his son’s professor) termed the “organizational sequence” (Richards 2001, 
247). With the evolutionary emergence of human consciousness in what was taken 
to be the (as yet) most complex organism in this sequence, Schelling believed that 
Nature had acquired the capacity to reflect upon itself. There is, no doubt, a moment 
of humanist hubris here, but it is qualified by the recognition not only of human 
dependence upon the prior and ongoing processes of natural becoming, but also of 
the untranscendable limits of human knowledge. If we are ourselves a part of nature, 
we can never step outside it to know it as a whole; and since, according to Schell-
ing’s holistic thinking, the individual parts acquire their full meaning and signifi-
cance only in relation to this elusive whole, any understanding that we form of them 
will necessarily be partial. Not only does this imply that nature can never be fully 
transparent to human reason: Schelling also came to accept that reason could not be 
self-grounding (Bowie 1993, 159–168). Moreover, Schelling’s recognition of the role 
of ‘instinct’ in shaping every creature’s ‘sphere of characteristic impressions’ implies 
that humans are no less enclosed within what von Uexküll would later characterize as 
a species-specific semiotic bubble than are other living beings. Schelling’s proto-bio-
semiotic elaboration of Kielmeyer’s ‘organizational sequence’ does nonetheless point 
towards the growth in ‘semiotic freedom’ associated with the development of more 
complex organisms along a continuum that, in Jesper Hoffmeyer’s analysis also cul-
minates, at least for the present, and insofar as we can tell, with articulate human lan-
guage. Schelling put it this way: in the human sphere, the creative freedom of natura 
naturans, which Schlegel tropes as Earth’s poesy, is raised to a new ‘potency.’
Under the electrifying influence of his conversations with Schlegel’s group, 
Schelling came to identify the work of art, that is to say, the process of artistic cre-
ation, as the privileged locus for the re-unification, on a higher level, of mind and 
matter, thought and feeling, conscious and ‘unconscious.’ In his System of Transcen-
dental Idealism, Schelling resolves the opposition between the ‘unconscious’ poesy 
of (non-human) nature and the intentionality of human artistic creation that was 
implicit in the opening effusion of Schlegel’s Dialogue, by proposing that the work of 
art is not, after all, a purely intentional product, but rather emerges from the interplay 
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of unconscious urgings (the subject’s ‘inner nature’) and conscious crafting. In Robert 
Richards’ gloss, Schelling’s argument runs like this:
Insistent forces thus well up from the unconscious nature of the artist and rush in turbulent 
cascades through the narrows of consciousness. This creates […] violent eddies of contradiction 
that “set in motion the artistic urge.” Such contradictions can only be calmed in the execution of 
the work of art. As the artist comes to rest in the finished, objective product, he or she will sense 
the union of nature and self, of necessity and freedom, of – finally – the unconscious and the 
conscious self. (Richards 2001, 162)
In this work, Schelling also discusses a mental phenomenon that he terms ‘aesthetic 
intuition’ (ästhetische Anschauung), which he believed to play an important role 
in scientific discovery no less than in artistic creativity. Such intuitions are in play, 
Schelling (2001, 227–228) argues, when an idea impresses itself upon the mind before 
one has grasped what it means or how it has been arrived at, or when a sense of the 
whole has been glimpsed prior to the analysis of the parts that constitute the phenom-
enon in question. It is the ‘poetic capacity’ (Dichtungsvermögen) that enables these 
kinds of intuitions to find their initial articulation in figurative language: metaphor, 
in this sense, constitutes a bridge whereby that which is as yet unknown enters into 
the sphere of the known. As Wendy Wheeler (2011) has observed, Schelling’s theory 
of the creative agency of metaphor (and, I would add, aesthetic intuition more gen-
erally) can be seen as a significant precursor to Peirce’s notion of ‘abduction’: that is, 
the process whereby signs that have been registered and associations that have been 
made below the level of consciousness by the Umwelt-aware embodied mind give rise 
to insightful new “hunches.”
3  Ecosemiotics in English Romantic Verse
Just as the process of artistic creation requires the capacity to tune in to one’s own 
inner nature, so too, it was widely believed during the Romantic period, to appre-
hend the “voice” of other-than-human nature necessitated the relinquishment of an 
objectifying and instrumentalist agenda (Zimmermann 1978, 244). This perspective, 
which can be found on both sides of the English Channel, is formulated programmat-
ically in William Wordsworth’s paired poems, “Expostulation and Reply” and “The 
Tables Turned,” in the avant-garde collection that he published with Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, Lyrical Ballads ([1798] 1992, 107–109). Chided by his friend, “Matthew,” for 
sitting around idly daydreaming by the shore of a lake when he should be improv-
ing his mind by imbibing “the spirit/breathed/From dead men to their kind” in the 
medium of the written word, the speaker of “Expostulation and Reply,” who shares 
the author’s name of “William,” counters with a philosophical defense of contempla-
tion, arguing that the cultivation of a “wise passiveness” affords a different kind of 
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mental nourishment, namely by means of those other-than-human utterances that 
arrive unbidden from “the mighty sum/Of things forever speaking.” In the following 
poem, William “turns the tables” on his bookish friend by chiding him for sitting 
around reading when he should be out for a meditative evening stroll, exposing 
himself thereby to what is mysteriously referred to as “the light of things.” Elsewhere 
(Rigby 2014b, 118–120) I have argued that this involves stilling oneself sufficiently to 
allow things to disclose themselves in their own way and their own time: this is to 
“come forth,” as we read in the last lines, “and bring with you a heart/That watches 
and receives.” In order to allow yourself to be illuminated by the “light of things,” 
then, you are going to need to surrender for the moment your perhaps perfectly legit-
imate desire to objectively know and instrumentally use them, and position yourself 
instead as the recipient of whatever it is that they might have to reveal to you, perhaps 
surprisingly, even amazingly, that is to say, in ways that exceed your expectations, 
comprehension, and capacity adequately to respond to their address.
In another poem from Lyrical Ballads, “Lines Written in Early Spring,” the 
speaker, who is reclining in a grove in just such a contemplative state of mind, appre-
hends not only “a thousand blended notes,” the diverse sounds of the more-than-hu-
man world in which he is immersed, but also the pleasure that the particular beings 
who surround him appear to be taking in their own inter-active existence:
Through primrose tufts, in that green bower,
The periwinkle trailed its wreathe;
And ‘tis my faith that every flower
Enjoys the air it breathes.
The birds around me hopped and played,
Their thoughts I cannot measure:–
But the least motion which they made,
It seemed a thrill of pleasure.
The budding twigs spread out their fan,
To catch the breezy air;
And I must think, do all I can,
That there was pleasure there (Wordsworth 1992, 76)
As Marjorie Levinson (2007) has observed, Wordsworth’s verbal constructions imply 
an active reaching out to aspects of the environment. Together with the speaker’s 
profession of “faith” that in doing so these birds and plants were taking pleasure in 
their own existence, there is an echo here of Baruch Spinoza’s concept of conatus i.e. 
the impulse to preserve their being and augment their capacities, to compose and 
recompose themselves with and through their dynamic relations with others, which 
he accorded to all physical entities, animate and inanimate, individual and collec-
tive. Levinson rightly attributes the reception of Spinoza within English Romanti-
cism to the Spinoza-controversy of the mid-1780s, but without noting the specifically 
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Herderian cast of Wordsworth’s neo-Spinozism. This is perhaps most evident in his 
famous “Lines Composed a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey, on revisiting the Banks 
of the Wye during a Tour. July 13, 1798,” when the speaker recalls being arrested by:
[…] the sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things (Wordsworth 1992, 118)
This divine “something” is no longer a static substance, but an indwelling propul-
sive force, “a motion and a spirit,” which is materialized in the “least motion” of all 
“Nature’s works,” including the “human soul,” as we read in “Lines Written in Early 
Spring,” in their endeavour to “preserve a kinetic poise within a dynamic ensemble of 
relations, an ensemble that also composes them as individuals” (Levinson 2007, 377). 
What Wordsworth also hints at here is that this process of interactive co-becoming 
is inherently semiotic, with plants as well as birds seen to have a sense of their own 
existence within what Schelling termed their distinctive ‘spheres of characteristic 
impressions.’
Among Romantic poets none attend more closely and caringly to the sign rela-
tions of fellow creatures than the English poet John Clare (1793–1864). I would there-
fore like to conclude with a brief discussion of one of his many ecosemiotic animal 
poems, “The Yellowhammer’s Nest” (Clare 2003, 185). Here, as in his other bird’s nest 
poems, Clare deploys the uniquely human code of writing, along with the culturally 
specific conventions of Romantic counter-pastoral, to invite the reader to participate 
imaginatively in a rural ramble, with a view to gaining a better appreciation of the 
life-world of another being. In so doing, he also draws attention to the corporeality 
of human semiosis in his depiction of the physical actions and sensory perceptions 
that enable the discovery of the hidden nests. In “The Yellowhammer’s Nest,” for 
example, this involves altering a habituated mode of bodily comportment, as the 
interlocutor is invited to “stoop/And seek” the nest of this vulnerably ground-nesting 
bird. In the multivalent semiotic frame of the poem, this surrender of upright posture 
in turn becomes legible as a metaphor for the surrender of human sovereignty, if not, 
as becomes apparent in all of Clare’s verse, of the ethical responsibility of respecting, 
and where appropriate, protecting the lives of otherkind. This begins with becoming 
attentive to other-than-human practices of poietic environing, or place-making, such 
as the building of nests. Here, this is shown to involve the recoding of material objects 
appropriated from the human Umwelt, which acquire a new meaning when incorpo-
rated into that of the birds, such as the “bleachéd stubbles and the withered fare of 
last year’s harvest”, which, together with “the horse’s sable hair,” provide building 
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materials for the Yellowhammer. In addition, Clare highlights the affective dimension 
of the bird’s interpretation of phenomena in their Umwelt, as the speaker observes 
the outward signs, in the ‘natural language’ of affect (to recall Herder), of the Yellow-
hammer’s apprehension of the cowboy harvesting dewberries as a potential source of 
threat; similarly, he detects a mournful tone in the parent birds’ warbling in the wake 
of the loss of their young to a watchful snake, for whom the fledglings had been inter-
preted (appropriately enough for them, but tragically for the bereaved birds) as food. 
While Clare’s poems invite empathy on the basis of a shared creatureliness, “The Yel-
lowhammer’s Nest” nonetheless also draws attention to the potentially colonizing 
tendency of human claims to be able to decode “nature’s poesy”:
Five eggs, pen-scribbled o’er with ink their shells
Resembling writing scrawls which fancy reads
As nature’s poesy and pastoral spells— (Clare 2003, 185)
By attributing the recognition of resemblances between egg-shell markings and 
“writing scrawls” to “fancy,” Clare implicitly urges respect for the alterity of otherkind 
and their unfamiliar Umwelten.
As I have argued elsewhere (Rigby 2014a) with regard to Goethe’s poem “The 
Metamorphosis of Plants” (1798), it is with respect to the ethical implications of 
observing both continuities and differences between human and non-human semi-
otic processes and environings, that a reconsideration of Romantic ecopoetics might 
contribute to advancing biosemiotic research in the present: Romantic philosophy 
and literature, in other words, is not merely of historical interest for its pre-figuration 
of later biosemiotic insights; it might also help to provide an enhanced understand-
ing of the complex interrelationship between natural becoming, or the ‘language of 
nature,’ cultural codes, and poetic communication. There is much more research to 
be done in this area by biosemiotically-inclined Romanticists. More generally though, 
too, biosemiotic ecocriticism is still in its infancy. While I have begun to suggest some 
of the ways in which particular works of Romantic thought and literature engage with 
more-than-human sign relations, such engagements are awaiting exploration with 
respect to other times and places too, as indicated by Louise Westling (2014 and ↗3 
Merleau-Ponty and the Eco-Literary Imaginary) in her biosemiotically-informed dis-
cussion of the ‘ecological imaginary’ from the ancient Sumerian Epic of Giglamesh 
through to contemporary poetry and fiction, in relation to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology and especially his remarkable late lectures on Nature. In addition, 
and crucially, literature (and other creative arts) can provide great insight into the 
dynamic interactivity of verbal and non-verbal semiosis within and between human 
percepts, affects, and relations. This lies at the center of much of Wendy Wheeler’s 
biosemiotic research, and is explored further in the previous chapter (↗1 The Lightest 
Burden).
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